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Abstract
In this article, we provide an introduction to simulation for cybersecurity and focus on three
themes: (1) an overview of the cybersecurity domain; (2) a summary of notable simulation re-
search efforts for cybersecurity; and (3) a proposed way forward on how simulations could broad-
en cybersecurity efforts. The overview of cybersecurity provides readers with a foundational per-
spective of cybersecurity in the light of targets, threats, and preventive measures. The simulation
research section details the current role that simulation plays in cybersecurity, which mainly falls
on representative environment building; test, evaluate, and explore; training and exercises; risk
analysis and assessment; and humans in cybersecurity research. The proposed way forward sec-
tion posits that the advancement of collecting and accessing sociotechnological data to inform
models, the creation of new theoretical constructs, and the integration and improvement of behav-
ioral models are needed to advance cybersecurity efforts.
Key words: cybersecurity simulation, modeling and simulation, human representation in cybersecurity, cyber-physical system,
cybersecurity modeling
Introduction
Reliance on information technology (IT) has grown significantly
since the bloom of the Internet [1]. People and organizations use
technology for mission-critical tasks such as banking, personnel
management, or collaborative work. While IT makes accomplishing
such tasks more convenient, it brings about serious security chal-
lenges that need to be addressed by all parties ranging from individu-
als to governments [2].
For individuals, one of the significant challenges is the release of
personal information as a result of cyberattacks [3, 4]. Stolen identity
information is mostly used for fraudulent transactions such as loan
applications and tax returns. In 2010, there were an estimated 8.1 M
victims of identity thefts in the USA alone [5]—by 2018, that number
had risen to 14.4 M [6]. For corporations, financial losses due to
cyberattacks are immense [7]. Lewis [8] estimates the annual costs of
cybercrime to the global economy are getting close to US$500 billion,
and this does not include the losses due to a damaged reputation.
Furthermore, national security is also impacted by cyberattacks, tar-
geting mission-critical private sector contractors and critical infra-
structures, affect the stability of a country. In the USA, officials
acknowledge that critical infrastructures have been under deliberate
attacks, and repairing damages has been costly for the country [9, 10].
Furthermore, the USA is only one of the many victims of such attacks.
In Estonia, for instance, cyberattackers laid siege to the banking,
media, and other infrastructures that nearly crippled the country [11].
To protect and defend themselves from cyberattacks, these countries
are increasingly outlining their position on cyberspace, cybercrime,
and cybersecurity [12]. The UK Government, for instance, dedicated
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£1.9 billion over 5 years (2016–21) to fund a cybersecurity program
because they see cybersecurity as one of the top priorities for their
country [13]. Similarly, US government agencies, including the US
Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and several departments of the US Armed Forces, main-
tain cybersecurity divisions. Despite these efforts, cybersecurity is still
a formidable and ever-evolving challenge because it involves a mix of
physical, software, and human systems. To understand and study this
system of systems, we currently rely on physical, emulated, and simu-
lated models.
“Physical” models are those “whose physical characteristics re-
semble the physical characteristics of the system being modeled”
[14]. In the context of cybersecurity, they are a mix of hardware and
software which are connected via a network (isolated from function-
ing networks and the Internet) to capture a representative system.
Physical models are used to test the effect of attacks or evaluate
measures of protection without affecting the real system. However,
they can be very costly [15] and do not incorporate the human
actors that interact with the real system.
“Emulators” act in the place of a real device as part of a repre-
sentative system and are usually realized as software [16, 17].
Emulators rely on virtualization or the creation of virtual machines
to represent real computers and devices. Emulators provide greater
flexibility than physical models because it is easier, faster, and more
cost-effective to make changes in design and scale [17, 18].
However, much like physical models, emulators do not take into ac-
count the human actor and the social contracts that govern the life
of an organization or society.
“Simulation models” are purposeful abstractions of physical sys-
tems [19] to explore how the complex interrelation between the
human, social, software, and hardware systems might lead to vul-
nerability or resilience. Simulation models provide a means for
examining complex interactions and changes within the system over
time, including the influence of social actors. For many domains,
there are significant insights that can be gained from the use of simu-
lation models such as ecological models that aid sustainable urban
development [20], social network analysis benefits from the applica-
tion of simulation to the understanding diffusion [21], and ad hoc
network routing [22]. Likewise, we posit that there are many bene-
fits of using simulations for cybersecurity research.
In this article, we focus on the application of simulation to the
cybersecurity domain. In this respect, we first introduce an overview
of cybersecurity (“An overview of cybersecurity” section), which
provides a characterization of cybersecurity research at large. We
use this characterization as a guiding framework to understand state
of the art in the application of simulations in the cybersecurity do-
main (“An overview of simulation research efforts for
cybersecurity” section). Lastly, we propose a way forward for simu-
lation research and application in cybersecurity (“Future directions”
section) and conclude (“Conclusion” section) with the summary of
this review article.
An overview of cybersecurity
The landscape of cybersecurity is large, ranging from individuals to
nations, and continuously evolves with new threats and counter-
measures. This dynamic nature of cybersecurity makes it challenging
to find an objective consensus on a definition. Definitions from a
sample of sources include:
i. “The state of being safe from electronic crime and the measures
taken to achieve this” [23].
ii. “The activity or process, ability or capability, or state whereby
information and communications systems and the information
contained therein are protected from and/or defended against
damage, unauthorized use or modification, or exploitation”
[24].
iii. “Cyber security is the collection of tools, policies, security con-
cepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management
approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and
technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment
and organization and user’s assets.” [25].
iv. “Prevention of damage to, protection of, and restoration of
computers, electronic communications systems, electronic com-
munications services, wire communication, and electronic com-
munication, including information contained therein, to ensure
its availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and
nonrepudiation.” [26].
Based on these definitions, we surmise that the goal of cyberse-
curity is about defending and protecting cyberspace to ensure avail-
ability, integrity, and confidentiality. In that respect, we characterize
cybersecurity along three dimensions: targets, threats, and prevent-
ive measures. These dimensions were inferred from the literature re-
view and structured as a characterization of cybersecurity
(Figure 1). Putting everything together, we define cybersecurity as
“the practice of protecting targets and their operations from threats,
through a combination of preventive measures.” The purpose of the
definition and its characterization is to provide a foundational
understanding of the different relevant components of cybersecurity
and the areas in which simulation and modeling can aid
cybersecurity.
Other characterizations, such as the taxonomy of operational
cybersecurity risk [27] and the cybersecurity management taxonomy
[28], address specific areas of cybersecurity and provide more detail
for that area. For instance, the taxonomy of operational cybersecur-
ity risk provides very detailed subcategories like “Deliberate ¼>
Vandalism” of the “Action of People.” However, with the proposed
characterization, we seek to broaden the perspective to be more in-
clusive and capture a variety of potential scenarios.
Our definition is compatible with state-of-the-art cybersecurity
concepts. The Kill Chain [29] concept of Lockheed Martin aims to
deal with advanced persistent threats (APTs), which are often
Figure 1: Characterization of cybersecurity.
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conducted as a series of dependent and well-crafted actions. In com-
parison to our definition, “targets” are identified in the
“Reconnaissance” step, while other steps from “Weaponization” to
“Actions on Objectives” are captured in the form of “threats.” The
“preventive measures” taken to break this chain are those repre-
sented as “Courses of Actions.” The Diamond Model is a well-
known intrusion activity characterization model composed of four
features, including “adversary,” “infrastructure,” “capability,” and
“victim” [30]. In the Diamond Model, “an adversary is the actor/or-
ganization responsible for utilizing a capability against the victim to
achieve their intent” [30]. Compared to our taxonomy,
“adversaries” and their “capabilities” can be represented using
“threats,” whereas the “infrastructure” and “victim” can be repre-
sented by “targets.” Since the Diamond model is based on a cyberat-
tack, “preventive measures” are not captured in their taxonomy. A
similar comparison exists with the PrEP Framework [31], which
characterizes malware attacks. The combined concept of
“propagation method,” “payload,” and “exploits” make up the
“treats on targets.” Again, preventive measures are not captured in
their taxonomy because their framework is based on the character-
ization of malware attacks. With these comparisons in place, we
provide further detail on our three main pillars of cybersecurity in
the following sections.
Targets
Targets refer to systems, data, and personnel of interests whose
breach or access can provide benefits to nonlegitimate users or par-
ties. These targets are categorized as Information and
Communications Technology (ICT), data systems, and human sys-
tems (i.e., personnel). ICT describes the physical and networked sys-
tems that have common denominators like computing power,
information processing, and computer networks that provide us the
means of accomplishing tasks with greater convenience through net-
worked infrastructures. These physical systems are often the focus
of cyberattackers. Telecommunication attacks, including distributed
denial of service (DDoS), routing attacks, and physical sabotage, to
name a few, are ever-increasing [32]. Attacks have also been perpe-
trated against “secure” networks—private computer networks not
connected to the Internet or telecommunication main infrastructure.
The case of JPMorgan Chase is perhaps one of the most alarming
ones. Peripheral devices were used to initiate the attacks; attackers
used, and even infected, automated teller machine (ATM) and
point-of-sale (POS) devices and were able to get into the bank’s sys-
tem and operate undetected for about a month [33].
Sometimes, however, the goal is to access data more than the
physical system itself. Data systems or databases contain confiden-
tial information such as financial data, personal information, and in-
formation relating to national security. While increased computing
power has provided a mechanism for vast amounts of data storage,
it has also created a target-rich environment for cyberattacks. The
attack on JPMorgan Chase’s infrastructure was a lead into their
data systems. It ended up relinquishing 76 million customer records
with unknown secrets into the attackers’ hands in addition to severe
damage to the company’s reputation [33]. In the information age,
knowledge is power, and knowledge is generally stored and trans-
ferred through data systems. During Georgia’s conflict with Russia,
Internet traffic to Georgia was rerouted through Russia and Turkey
for “data sniffing” [34]. These examples are just the tip of the ice-
berg, as of July 2019, the Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC)
identified over 10 000 publicly-noticed data breaches in the US
alone, exposing over 1.6 billion data records collectively [35].
Targeting systems or data requires overcoming organizations’
defense mechanisms such as firewalls and intrusion detection sys-
tems (IDSs). This is often time-consuming and expensive. For this
reason, many attackers follow a way around by targeting “system
users” instead. A report from IBM reveals that large percentages of
cyber breaches involve some form of human error [36]. Similar find-
ings have been found in reports published by Verizon and Symantec
[37]. Social engineering, tricking users via deceptive means to obtain
data or access to a system, is a common way of targeting people, es-
pecially those who work in sectors critical to a nation. Back in 2011,
attackers gained access to RSA Security’s servers with the use of the
spear-phishing technique. While only one user was tricked into
opening an Excel spreadsheet attachment with an embedded file
that exploited vulnerability, it was sufficient for attackers to access
the system and export sensitive data to third-party servers [38]. A
similar incident occurred in Oak Ridge National Laboratory that
yielded a loss of data [39]. It is important to note that RSA
Security’s expertise is cybersecurity, and Oak Ridge National
Laboratory is one of the leading research laboratories of the US
Department of Energy.
Ultimately, targeting systems, data, and people have a purpose.
This purpose can be of using or selling information, modifying sys-
tems, or simply an exercise of cyber skills. The potential negative im-
pact of such attacks is called a threat.
Threats
Threats refer to “any circumstance or event with the potential to ad-
versely impact organizational operations (including mission, func-
tions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other
organizations, or the Nation through an information system via un-
authorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of informa-
tion, and denial of service” [40]. We refer to attacks as the
realization of threats. “Types of attacks” encompass a wide range of
possibilities that rely on a simple to very sophisticated tools and
algorithms focusing on system and data. For example, unpatched or
0-day (i.e., previously unknown) vulnerabilities provide access to a
known flaw in software that can reveal a stepping stone for attack-
ers with access and make the system susceptible to negative out-
comes; or a socially engineered attack such as a phishing email with
malware attached can relinquish system control to an attacker [41].
In an incident, US-based insurance company Anthem had millions of
customer records stolen due to a vulnerability that opened the door
to intruders [42]. More sophisticated attackers, once they gain ac-
cess, may modify the system for further actions based on actual pur-
pose. If the purpose of the attacker, for instance, is to access other
connected systems requiring high-level permissions, the attacker
likely will try escalating the privileges [43].
Another method of attacking a system is through wide-scale dis-
ruption. One of the most common ways to disrupt an Internet-
connected service is to bombard it with automated calls to exhaust
the service so it cannot serve actual users. The DDoS attack is a
coordinated, typically large-scale attack intended to overload a sys-
tem making resources unavailable to legitimate users. “Operation
Ababil” is an example DDoS attack that attempted to disrupt some
US-based banking companies [44]. A virus can cause a similar halt
to a system as happened in the South Korean banking system [45].
And while rare, an attacker may attempt to disrupt the system by
damaging or destroying it. Stuxnet is a prime example of an attack
that compromised and nearly destroyed a nuclear facility in Iran
[46].
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Preventive measures
The best cybersecurity defense is the one that stops attacks from
ever occurring. It is almost impossible to achieve as long as systems
remain connected to other systems via networks or the Internet.
Therefore, we rely on preventive measures which we categorize into
three areas: technology, education, and policy.
“Technology” encompasses the tools, techniques, and software
that detect, prevent, or stop an attack. A few of the common technolo-
gies include anti-virus software, firewalls, automated updates, and
IDSs. Antivirus software recognizes known malicious programs (e.g.,
computer viruses, worms, Trojans) using various techniques such as
pattern-based detection [47] and prevents their execution. Automated
updates ensure that systems have the most up-to-date security to elim-
inate known vulnerabilities. IDS deals with monitoring computer and
network events and analyzing them for detection of known incidents
such as policy or security violations and violation attempts [48].
Techniques (i.e., protocols and algorithms) also play a vital role in
preventing cyberattacks or deterring attackers. Authorization mecha-
nisms, for instance, are a common way to secure against unauthorized
use. Secure communication technologies may prevent exposure of
data transferred over some networking infrastructure. In these cases,
protocols like Transport Layer Security [49] and Secure Shell [50] pro-
vide a means for encrypting and protecting transferred data. Another
technique for securing systems requires setting traps for would-be
intruders. Honeypots, resources that have no inherent value except
the ability to track and gather intelligence about attacks [51], can
slow attacks, provide information about new types of attacks, and no-
tify analysts when a system is under attack.
Technology is a prominent part of securing cyberspace.
However, technology alone does not suffice. Over 90% of security
incidents list human error as a factor [36]. Prevention measures, to
be effective, must address the human component. “Education” and
“training” are vital to cybersecurity. Training ranges from teaching
users basic security concepts like safe browsing, recognizing suspi-
cious (phishing) messages, password security, understanding soft-
ware permissions, and secure data disposal, to teaching security
professionals how to recognize and react to a cyberthreat.
Organizations must also be educated in cybersecurity. This
occurs through the implementation and enforcement of “policy and
procedures.” With cyberspace being such a critical component of al-
most all organizations, it is necessary to describe acceptable uses
and responsibilities, explicitly. Documented best practices and for-
mal policies shared throughout organizations can aid users and im-
prove security. Additionally, governments are crafting laws and
determining enforcement protocols for cyberattacks. This, however,
is beyond the scope of this article.
Synthesizing this section, we surmise that the cybersecurity do-
main is a combination of technical efforts that focus on protecting
targets from threats through a mixture of preventive measures.
Efforts to develop physical, emulation, and simulation capabilities
have taken place, each with different levels of adaption [52].
Physical and emulation approaches are by far the most adopted
approaches due to the realism that they bring to activities such as ex-
perimentation and testing. Research with physical systems repre-
sents the highest fidelity possible. However, testing cyberattacks on
the Internet can have severe consequences. Alternatively, building a
duplicate system for testing is either unfeasible or costly. Emulations
allow researchers and practitioners to create virtual networks and
testbeds on which they can experiment under “specific” conditions
about system and network. Simulations, on the other hand, allow
researchers and practitioners to test an abstraction of the system
that contains only features of interest, without the need for detail,
toward answering a research question. Simulations are advanta-
geous, generally requiring less computational resources compared to
emulation and physical solutions, making it cost-effective [15] and
easier to scale to a large number in network size [53].
It is important to note that the literature provides perspectives of
cybersecurity from two viewpoints: defending targets against threats
through a combination of preventative measures and devising
attacks aimed at various targets using a multitude of threats that by-
pass preventative measures. While it is equally important to consider
both perspectives in understanding security, this work focuses on
the former view.
An overview of simulation research efforts for
cybersecurity
As a research area, simulation is an interdisciplinary endeavor with
a vast literature. Cybersecurity research is also interdisciplinary and
its literature is even larger and, making it challenging for us to truth-
fully capture the intersection of the two areas. To this end, we lever-
aged recent cybersecurity reports, our anecdotal experience from
cybersecurity simulation research and development, and discussions
with experts led us to cover five areas in our review. These are (i)
representative environment building; (ii) test, evaluate, and explore;
(iii) training and exercises; (iv) risk analysis and assessment; and (v)
examining the role of people in the cybersecurity domain. There is a
strong connection between these areas of research. Figure 2 shows
the relationship of components that emerged from our review of
simulation for cybersecurity. An operational environment, in the
lexicon of Damodaran and Couretas [54], is the targetable tool in a
simulation event. Operational environment building is foundational
to aiding our understanding of cybersecurity and providing the ne-
cessary environment, including network topology and structure for
the next research area: testing, evaluation, and exploration. These
two pieces facilitate the ability to ask “what if” questions based on
the operational environment. Another goal of simulation for cyber-
security is to aid in analyzing and assessing the overall risk of the
system and providing enhanced training capabilities and conducting
exercises. Finally, human action is introduced in cybersecurity simu-
lation to help understand the strengths and vulnerabilities that users,
attackers, and defenders bring to cybersecurity.
Representative environment building
Representative environment building refers to the creation of net-
works and connected systems. Research in cybersecurity requires a
Figure 2: Identified areas of research for simulation of cybersecurity.
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platform on which to test. Software-based network simulators and
network traffic algorithms can be used to test specific types of cyber-
attacks. Open source and commercial network simulation libraries
and tools are used for implementing network environment of simu-
lations. Early attempts of network simulators date back to the
1980s and were mainly developed to test different routing and
scheduling algorithms [55]. The use of such simulated networks was
later possible when computing power increased and cyberattacks be-
come prevalent. OMNeTþþ [56] and INET Framework for
OMNETþþ [57] are robust open-source software able to simulate a
vast array of devices such as wired/wireless communication net-
works, sensor networks, and on-chip networks, to name a few.
While not as comprehensive as OMNeTþþ, ns-3 [58] is another
popular network simulator that supports wired/wireless networks
and virtualization. ns-2 [59] is still in use as of this writing although
it was preceded by ns-3. There are many earlier open-source net-
work simulation efforts such as SSFNet [60], GTNetS [61], and
JiST/SWANS [62] which are not actively being developed or main-
tained. There are many other options for researchers to build a
simulation-based representative environment. Sarkar and Halim
[63] reviewed existing network simulators classified and compared
based on type, deployment mode, network impairments, and proto-
cols supported. Ojie and Pereira [64] provide a more recent review
but focused on the simulation of the Internet of Things.
Network simulators usually involve only representation of devi-
ces, technologies, and communication between them while missing
some critical components of a cyber scenario [52]. Others have pro-
posed to adopt a Live, Virtual, Constructive (LVC) approach to rep-
resentative environment building [54, 65, 66]. According to
Damodaran and Couretas [54]:
• Live (cyber) simulation: Real actors interact with physical sys-
tems of real computers connected to real, and usually isolated
networks.
• Virtual (cyber) simulation: Real actors interact with emulation
or simulation of networks or emulated or simulated actors inter-
act with real and usually isolated networks.
• Constructive (cyber) simulation: Simulated or emulated actors
interact with emulations or simulations of networks.
Varshney et al. [65] developed an LVC framework called
StealthNet to support testing, evaluation, and exercises using cyber-
security scenarios. Their framework involves user behavior models
representing blue and red forces. According to an example scenario
they present, red forces execute timed predefined actions in a DDoS
scenario. Therefore, it can be used to replicate a scenario, but it can-
not adapt to different evolving and dynamic conditions due to its
scripted nature. Emulytics, is an LVC platform from Sandia
National Lab that supports cyber training and testing [15]. Some of
Emulytics capabilities include mechanisms for rapid specifications
and deployment of networks, protocol support for networked devi-
ces, instantiations of networks with large numbers of nodes, and
representation of wired and wireless communications. Overall, be-
cause of the number of open-source options, simulation has allowed
more researchers and more areas of research to be positively
impacted. One such area is security testing, evaluation, and
exploration.
Test, evaluation, and exploration
The ability to explore, test, and evaluate a situation is likely the
most widely used capability of simulation because of the rapid
experimenting flexibility it provides. In one of the earlier examples,
Zhou and Lang [67] evaluated an intrusion detection algorithm
using the OPNET network simulation environment (OPNET is no
longer available). To add more, Hancock and Lamont [68] exam-
ined patterns associated with intrusion detection and aided in the
classification of network attacks. However, when the network gets
large, it becomes a challenging task to place the IDS. Puzis et al. [69]
identified the optimal placement of intrusion detection and preven-
tion systems in such large networks. Wagner et al. [70] explored par-
titioning the network into sections to complicate gaining attackers
access to the network. Bahşi et al. [71] analyzed literature to find
out the methods employed in assessing cyber impact on missions
and concluded that simulation is the dominant approach.
Cohen [72] pioneered early efforts in the simulation of cyberat-
tacks, defenses, and consequences. While Cohen’s cause and effect
model was too simplistic for practical application, his efforts
spurred the work of others. Chi et al. [73] continued the effort to
employ simulation using a discrete-event system specification
(DEVS) model with a knowledge-based learning system for the at-
tacker and a statistical analyzer for vulnerability assessment. The
simulation can classify threats, specify attack mechanisms, verify
protection mechanisms, and evaluate consequences [73].
Cho and Ben-Asher [74] developed “Defense in Breadth,” which
is an integrated defense mechanism that combines IDS, deception
systems, and moving target defense (MTD) systems. They imple-
mented stochastic Petri nets using the Stochastic Petri Net Package
(SPNP) to evaluate “the performance of a system integrated with dif-
ferent defense mechanisms” (p. 6). Deception systems here are
mechanisms like honeypots that appear to be real parts of the net-
work but are put in place to mislead the attacker and study its be-
havior. MTDs, as mentioned, enable defenders to change system
behaviors, policies, or configurations automatically such that poten-
tial attack surfaces are moved dynamically.
In terms of evaluating the effect of threats and attacks, Kotenko
and Ulanov [75] designed and developed an agent-based simulation
framework called distributed denial of service simulator
(DDoSSIM), which uses OMNeTþþ and INET Framework as the
network simulation basis, to evaluate different DDoS attack and de-
fense mechanisms formed by software agents. Almajali et al. [76]
utilized ns-2 [59] to create a network of a power grid and analyze
the resiliency of the grid in case of DoS attack on the network.
Sonchack and Aviv [77] reported on large-scale evaluation of se-
curity systems (LESS), which simulates large-scale attacks by auto-
matically configuring host agents based on background traffic
samples and current malicious traffic models. It has the capacity to
simulate 100 000 hosts with up to 5000 malicious hosts, thus pro-
viding an additional level of detail in security evaluation. Cyber
Analysis Modeling Evaluation for Operations (CAMEO) [78] mod-
eled and simulated various dynamics of a cyberecosystem such as
threats and defensive strategies. CAMEO, as the authors claim, can
be used to “verify and validate possible configurations and behavior
for cyber agile and resilient defenses, to study sensitivity to initial
configurations and discover unanticipated emergent behavior” (p.
2). Hahn and Govindarasu [79] proposed a metric to evaluate the
completeness of the implemented security mechanisms in smart grids
and also evaluate the applicability of the metric using simulation. It
is also noted that these efforts are based on measuring traffic data.
Technical systems that help recognize an attack and evaluate the
possible defenses are only effective if the appropriate responses are
executed. One aspect that is less explored in simulation for cyberse-
curity is finding conditions under which security might be vulner-
able. In this case, a simulation could find a combination of input
factors that lead to a desired (or undesired) output.
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IDSs are usually the first line of defense in an institutional setting
but they are not the only defense mechanisms to defend against mal-
ware or other malicious software. Modeling and simulation efforts
support such defense approaches. Garetto et al. [80] used a special
type of Markov chain to model the behavior of malware based on
its activity patterns in a network. Such an approach initiates new
mechanisms to catch malware other than signature-based
approaches. Similar malware dynamics have been captured in agent-
based and network simulation models to investigate the propagation
on scale-free networks [81], Wi-Fi router networks [82], and smart
grid networks [83]. Here, simulation studies allow safe testing of
real or hypothetical malware spread and evaluate potential mitiga-
tion measures.
There have been recent simulation efforts that generated datasets
for validation of a wide range of detection systems. Gore, Padilla
[84] used Markov Chains to generate feasible APT scenarios using
the Structured Threat Information eXpression language (STIX) and
seed data [85]. These plausible synthetic data provide researchers
with the ability to explore and understand scenarios that have not
yet occurred and validate against existing detection systems as well
as conduct training exercises and risk analysis. Lately, such synthetic
data generation has relied on via General Adversarial Networks too.
For instance, Lu and Li [86] and Kucuk and Yan [87] have devel-
oped systems to generate synthetic malware samples to be tested by
a classifier. We believe there is an open venue for such simulation,
especially critical domains such as the cybersecurity studies of con-
nected vehicles because real-world data of such type is not always
feasible to capture [88].
Training and exercises
Simulation can be effectively used in understanding an attack and
training for different scenarios. To this end, special units have been
established to conduct cybersecurity training and exercises at the na-
tional and institutional levels. For instance, the US Department of
Homeland Security established the National Cyber Exercise and
Planning program to support cybersecurity response plans based on
strategic exercises [89]. UK’s National Cyber Security Centre has
similar responsibilities [90]. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence
Centre of Excellence is responsible for organizing joint exercises
regarding both technical and strategic aspects of cybersecurity [91].
There are many notable training exercises that involve a form of
simulation organized by institutions listed above. A tabletop cyber
training exercise called Waking Shark II drew approximately 220
participants from UK Government agencies, banks, and financial
institutions. In the exercise, they simulated a disruption in the
wholesale market with the goal of understanding the impact of
cyberattacks and exercise communication flows between firms. The
US Department of Homeland Security has conducted a similar but
more comprehensive exercise called Cyber Storm since 2006.
According to the official report, the latest Cyber Storm event (Cyber
Storm VI) hosted a wide range of participants from “federal, state,
local, tribal and territorial entities and the private sector” [92]. The
goals of the exercise are reported as cybersecurity preparedness and
response in order to develop and revise plans and procedures.
These large-scale, hypothetical scenarios provide a positive
learning experience for the participants [93]. However, it is often
difficult to convene the number of people necessary, and such large-
scale gatherings are not suitable for many small to medium-size busi-
nesses. Self-paced exercises and tools are crucial to fill this gap. The
UK’s “Exercise in a Box” tool is a great example to satisfy this need.
It focuses on organizational practices regarding a hypothetical cyber
incident and response.
An alternative technique used for training is a video game-based
simulation. Current cyber training games include CyberProtect used
by the Department of Defense and the CyberCIEGE used by the US
Navy [94]. Such game-based trainings focus on information assur-
ance and understanding of cause-effect dynamics. There are also sys-
tems that generate learning through competition. UC Santa Barbara
host the International Capture the Flag (iCFT) competition and
SANS Institute host NetWars [95] that provide researchers an op-
portunity to learn about attack behaviors in a safe environment.
CyberNEXS is used to facilitate cyberdefense competitions [95].
iCFT is geared toward university students, although it is not limited
to them. NetWars and CyberNEXS engage high school students.
Training and engaging the widest possible audience in cyberaware-
ness and security are the objectives of the US National Initiative for
Cybersecurity Education [96]. Simulations and competitions support
such significant initiatives.
Risk analysis and assessment
As previously stated, the goal of cybersecurity is defending and pro-
tecting cyberspace through preventive measures. Creating a repre-
sentative operational environment for testing, evaluating, and
training against potential attacks and strategic defenses is an essen-
tial element. However, the size and scope of potential cyberattacks
make total security impossible. Systems still are exposed to risks
that can be analyzed and mitigated.
Risk analysis is a function that examines the likelihood of a
negative outcome. When applying this concept to cybersecurity,
threats are often measured regarding (i) the probability of a type of
attack, (ii) the probability of attack success, and (iii) loss associated
with a successful attack [97–99]. However, quantifying a loss is not
a simple task in cyberspace [100]. Losses are time-dependent, not
surfacing until a breach is discovered, and can reduce future value
such as the loss of intellectual property. Losses can be third-party
service provider-dependent—that is, interdependencies can create a
loss for an entity that was not directly attacked. There are several
approaches to risk analysis: probability risk assessment (PRA), at-
tack tree analysis (ATA), fault tree analysis (FTA), and failure mode
effect analysis (FMEA).
PRA quantifies risks based on statistical probabilities. PRA has
general stages: identify, quantify, evaluate, and accept [101, 102].
PRA is a theoretically sound approach and has been applied in dif-
ferent scenarios, such as DDoS attacks against a distance learning
system [103] and power grid generation losses. Monte Carlo simula-
tions are often applied to approximate the loss of value. Despite
these merits, PRA still suffers from several challenges when applied
to cybersecurity: (i) historical databases are not maintained; (ii) des-
pite a significant number of breaches, security data are not common-
ly shared; and (iii) the existing data is difficult to analyze for large,
complex networks [102]. To this end, there are a vast number of
efforts to encourage and incentivize cyber intelligence data standard-
ization, use, and share [104, 105]. For many organizations, the deci-
sion to participate in cyber intelligence sharing programs become a
perfect case for game theoretic modeling efforts. Researchers have
applied both standard and evolutionary game theoretic frameworks
in this domain to improve the availability of data for researchers
[106, 107].
Attack trees provide a formal means of describing and analyzing
the security of systems based on varying attacks [108]. Simulations
have been used in both the generation and evaluation of attack trees.
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The attack tree generation involves modeling of the attacker and
running it to simulate attacks, which are used to generate the tree
[109]. The evaluation of attack trees involves representing the sys-
tem using a suitable technique and conduct Monte Carlo runs [110].
FTA uses systematic backward reasoning to determine probabilities,
and FMEA uses a forward-inductive approach to do the same.
These methods only examine a single fault [111].
More recently, researchers have used simulation to analyze risk
across complex and interdependent systems. Charitoudi and Blyth
[112] used agent-based modeling and simulation (ABMS) to esti-
mate the cascading effects of an attack on a supply chain. Rybnicek
et al. [113] combined Game Theory and ABMS to study the impact
that an attack (and the subsequent defense) on critical infrastruc-
ture. Wang et al. [114] presented a simulation environment for ana-
lyzing and assessing the security Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems. The environment allows researchers
to model vulnerability exploitation to determine the scope of the ef-
fect. Musman and Turner [115] followed a game theoretic approach
to cybersecurity risk management with a cybersecurity game (CSG).
The CSG uses models to describe the system, threat environment,
and defender capabilities. The holistic approach is designed “for
system-level analysis to inform decision-makers of good security de-
sign principles, targeted improvements, cost-effective risk reduction
investments, and where defenses should be deployed” (p. 5). The
types and probability of attacks, as well as the cascading effect of
the interdependencies, make assessing risk in cybersecurity difficult.
This is further complicated by the human factor [116]. Whether it is
a careless user, a determined attacker, a skilled defender, or an in-
sider, people are central to the use and misuse of cyberspace.
Humans in cybersecurity
Attackers, cybersecurity analysts (CSA), system administrators, and
general system users interact to shape cyberspace today. Therefore,
each must be considered when studying cybersecurity. Attackers can
be script kiddies, state hackers, organized crime groups, insider at-
tacker, hobbyist, hacktivist, legitimate penetration testers, or terror-
ist. Their role in cyberspace is defined by their skill, knowledge,
resources, access, and motives or SKRAM [117]. Technology has
improved the defense of cyber systems; however, the defense is still
heavily dependent on who takes care of the system and who has ac-
cess to it.
Human actions as they relate to simulation for cybersecurity
have been far less explored compared to cyber systems especially
when considering criminal behavior. Several simulations have been
designed to explore network intrusion and other forms of cyberat-
tacks. Kotenko [118], for example, modeled a DDoS attack, and
Razak et al. [119] simulated network intrusions. However, these
simulations do not specifically portray the attacker. Early models
contained pre-scripted, static patterns, for attacker agents to follow
[120]. These models eventually gave way to game theoretic and cog-
nitive models [121], which provide a useful characterization of the
initiation of an attack but ignore a host of other social contexts—
user interactions, risk tolerance, social learning to name a few. Even
more recent network segmentation models such as AVAIL [122]
that improve on security simulations by evolving both attacker and
defender strategies lack a dynamic behavioral component. Schultz
[123], by contrast, examines indicators such as deliberate markers,
meaningful errors, preparatory behavior, correlated usage patterns,
verbal behavior, and personality traits to predict who an active in-
sider threat might be. Along similar lines, Vernon-Bido et al. [124]
investigated factors (group size, attack success rate, and
opportunity) that turn a predisposed user into a cyberattacker.
Moreover, Paternoster and Simpson [125], Nagin and Paternoster
[126], and Hu et al. [127], used the rational choice theory to model
committing a crime. These last few examples are not simulation
models but can also help determining the threats that they may
cause.
While attackers attempt to find unauthorized ways to use the
system, CSAs must evaluate information provided by the systems to
determine the level of potential risk. The risk message itself, the
means of communication, and the individual decision-making pro-
cess all influence the reaction to risk and alerts [128]. There is only a
limited number of models on CSA behavior like Rajivan et al. [129]
who developed an agent-based model to capture the cooperation of
CSAs to share knowledge of attack detection. The model simulates
the effectiveness of collaboration in increasing the number of alerts
resolved.
Representing users in cybersecurity simulation is not widely
researched. The work of Pussep et al. [130] and Blythe et al. [131] is
just a couple of reported research. Blythe et al. [131], for instance,
simulate system users as BDI (belief, desire, intention) agents accom-
plishing their routine tasks and communicating with each other.
When a cyberattack is simulated, the study captures user resiliency,
changes in the communication patterns, and how tasks are affected.
Again, this cognitive approach captures the human as a rational
decision-maker while leaving out behavioral complexities that may
be more telling when considering situations like attacks based on so-
cial engineering [52].
A summary
The studies reviewed in this section are by no means exhaustive; ra-
ther they are a sample of the breadth of simulation for cybersecurity.
Table 1 summarizes many of the studies presented throughout this
section and highlights how they relate to the target, threat, and pre-
ventive measure characterization proposed in “An overview of
cybersecurity” section. The table provides a quick reference for stud-
ies by purpose, coverage within the taxonomical representation, and
simulation type.
The “purpose” column shows what the simulation is built for
based on the five identified review topics. “Coverage in
cybersecurity” column shows what areas of cybersecurity landscape
(threats, targets, and preventive measures) these studies cover.
“Type” column indicates the nature of the simulation type whether
it is a platform, model, or others. Other, in this case, refers to simu-
lation exercises that combine platform, scenarios, and models.
“Names/References” column indicates citation information for
studies.
Table 1 demonstrates the level of work that exists in simulation
for cybersecurity. However, it also hints at the lack of focused work
in certain areas. The experience of studies involving people provides
insight into previously unimagined behavior by attackers and
defenders. From this, we can infer that our risk analysis might also
be upended when measuring the role individuals play in an organiza-
tion. Models developed at the Computer Emergency Response Team
at Carnegie Mellon [133], for instance, provide insight into what
factors and dynamics that may lead individuals to become insiders.
As such, these types of models provide evaluation and exploration
capabilities for considering preventive measures. Similarly, Moskal
et al. [134] considered attacker types to assess cyber threats through
simulation. They examine network vulnerabilities and system con-
figurations but also incorporate changes in the threat level of the
network when the attacker is added. Adding the behavioral
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Table 1: Summary of the surveyed papers according to their purpose, coverage in cybersecurity, and type























     Platform • LESS [77]
• CAMEO [78]
• Kotenko and Ulanov [75]
• Kotenko [118]
      Platform • StealthNet [65]
    Platform • Emulytics [15]
   Other • Walking Shark II [93]
• Cyber Storm [92]
     Platform • CyberProtect; CyberCIEGE [94];
Exercise in a Box
    Model • Zhou and Lang [67]
• Hancock and Lamont [68]
• Puzis et al. [69]
• Wagner et al. [70]
• Cohen [72]
• Chi, Park [73]
• Cho and Ben-Asher [74]
• Almajali et al. [76]
• Hahn and Govindarasu [79]
• Razak et al. [119]
   Model • Garetto et al. [80]
• Hosseini et al. [81]
• Eder-Neuhauser et al. [83]
    Model • Gore, Padilla [84]
• Lu and Li [86]
• Kucuk and Yan [87]
    Model • Kavak et al. [82]
• Keskin et al. [103]
• Tatar et al. [132]
  Model • Tosh et al. [106, 107]
  Model • Karray et al. [109]
   Model • Dalton et al. [110]
     Model • Hamilton and Hamilton [120]
• Dutt et al. [121]
     Model • Charitoudi and Blyth [112]
• Rybnicek et al. [113]
• Musman and Turner [115]
     Platform • Wang, Fang [114]
     Model • AVAIL [122]
    Model • Vernon-Bido et al. [124]
• Rajivan et al. [129]
• Pussep et al. [130]
• Blythe et al. [131]
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component to test beds and traffic generators like the Lincoln
Adaptable Real-time Information Assurance Testbed or LARIAT
[135] will aid in the advancement of cybersecurity simulations.
There are drawbacks related to modeling a system of systems
like cybersecurity. According to Windrum et al. [136], designing
representative models for simulation has several core issues of valid-
ation: (i) models are generally abstractions that focus on relation-
ships in isolation of the real, and often unknown, system (ii) models
are designed under assumptions, some of which may change with
empirical data while others are never subjected to empirical valid-
ation (iii) the number of variables used to describe the model are
limited, many variables are simplified or omitted to aid in under-
standing a particular relationship and (iv) models represent a pos-
sible theory based on data; however, data can also support alternate
theories; and testing and falsifying a hypothesis in isolation is not ac-
curate as the systems do not operate in isolation.
Simulation for cybersecurity is found in operational environment
building as well as in testing, evaluating, training, and risk analyzing
phases of cybersecurity. The elements of complexity, interdepend-
ence, and social connectivity show why simulation is an effective
tool for this research. However, there is still a lot more potential
when it comes to the use of simulation for cybersecurity.
Future directions
Cyberspace is a sociotechnical realm, and simulation is probably the
best tool available to explore this integration. Simulation provides
an arena for integrating operational environments with human be-
havior models to analyze the vulnerability of a network structure
given different types of users. Simulations give insight into the pos-
sible effects of the use and misuse of cyber systems. In an intercon-
nected society, simulation can show how attacks to one critical
infrastructure strain the entire system. As such, simulations can aid
in understanding the ripple effects of cyberattacks on the system and
society. We believe that to capture these dynamics effectively, there
is a need for more focused efforts. Our review in “An overview of
simulation research efforts for cybersecurity” section and current
trends in cybersecurity reveal that many independent efforts address
a piece in cybersecurity. There is a pressing need to develop syner-
getic efforts to improve the coverage, quality, and reuse of existing
studies. In this respect, we identified three main avenues for future
research to advance both cybersecurity and simulation.
i. Advance data collection and access
ii. Generate new theoretical constructs
iii. Improve behavioral models for simulation
Ouyang [137] notes one of the challenges of exploring the inter-
connection of critical infrastructure is the lack of precise data. The
same is true for cybersecurity in general. Data is generally sparse, in-
complete, or unavailable due to its sensitive nature. Similarly, there
have been efforts that encourage and illustrate the usefulness of
cybersecurity research datasets [138]. However, there is another
problem with the data—often, the right data is not collected.
Securing systems that affect the entire population requires cultural
data, economic data, and political data in addition to system and
threat information. Cybersecurity simulation models need data that
reflects the current social climate and norms. Prevention is most ef-
fective when we can understand and control the environment that
gives rise to an attack.
To this end, data collection needs to focus not just on the attack
but on the environment that gives rise to the attack. Data collection
methods for cybersecurity simulations should feed deep learning
[139] and other artificial intelligence (AI) techniques. These tools
provide a vibrant multilayered approach to representing vast
amounts of data, including social awareness data, which until now
might have seemed unrelated. AI and tools like Watson use cognitive
computing to harness the potential of the massive data that are
available [140]. They offer the possibility of finding connections in
data through simulations with greater context. Current work in this
area includes the emerging AI-based automated cybersecurity deci-
sion systems and their integration with simulations [70].
New data sources providing more information about the context
of attacks might lead to new theoretical constructs. Current theoret-
ical constructs in cybersecurity tend to be disparate and heavily de-
pendent on empiricism [141]. Foundational theories of network
science and cybersecurity center around attackers, defenders, net-
worked assets, and policies [142]. The defense technology continues
to advance at a rapid pace; defense against kernel rootkits [143] and
block chain-based data provenance [144] advance cybersecurity into
the cloud environments. However, attack strategies and maneuvers
around defenses move at an even faster pace infecting the system
with zombie bots and APTs. And vulnerabilities increase as the com-
plexity of the system expands. New theoretical constructs should in-
tegrate technology advances with theories of motivation, behavioral
analysis, and criminology to expand the science of cybersecurity to
cover the full spectrum of this human-made universe. Tisdale [28]
suggested a new construct based on the combination of Systems
Theory [145] and Complexity Leadership Theory [146]. These two
theories provide a strong foundation, but it is only a beginning.
Theories, like routine activity theory [147]—that stipulates that
crime requires three conditions: likely offender, a suitable target,
and absence of capable guardian—need to be updated to consider
the motivations of attackers in a world of unsuitable targets with the
presence of capable guardians. Simulation models provide a theory-
generation capability by modeling human behavior in cybersecurity
environments. The traditional “arms race” mentality focuses intern-
ally on improving the technical defense. A defense construct, and de-
fense models, should include an understanding of the adversary in a
manner that adjusts to behaviors and cultural norms observed in the
attacker.
A sociotechnical perspective forces us to rethink not only how
we conduct cybersecurity, but also how we implement that perspec-
tive when considering targets, threats, and preventive measures.
This becomes even more critical with the expansion of cyberphysical
systems (CPS). Hybrid simulation for cyberphysical systems [148]
describes the challenges associated with designing and testing CPS
but does not even address the massive security challenges that these
systems pose. As CPS becomes a larger part of everyday life, this
true marriage of social and technical systems must incorporate new
theoretical constructs and human behavior models into the simula-
tions [149].
Cybersecurity systems and behavioral models should range from
the actions of individual users through attackers and defenders and
into policymakers. Open problems such as attribution call for solu-
tions that combine data analysis and simulation. There is a need to
define the level of granularity concerning adversarial strategies vs.
tactics vs. intent, where state of the art is and challenges. It is im-
portant to highlight that a new perspective that considers the role of
people in cybersecurity is needed.
Models of humans and organizations are needed to provide an
exploratory ground for studying how social engineering campaigns,
for instance, can take place or what conditions may lead users to be-
come insider threats over the long term. Activities like risk analysis
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may be completely upended when measuring the role individuals
play in an organization. However, modeling human behavior in
cybersecurity presents several challenges, mainly due to the lack of
theories from psychology, criminology, or sociology that can pro-
vide a finer level of detail in the modeling of individuals. The effect-
iveness of simulations for cyber will be determined by several
factors, among which is the need for interdisciplinary work.
Simulation of cybersecurity, just like cybersecurity in general,
has focused primarily on the technical aspects. As we incorporate
users into the equation, we need to focus on the behavioral aspects.
Securing cyberspace is not simply a function of better technology; to
improve security, we need to understand the attacker, the user, the
defender, the organizational context to better model targets, threats,
and preventive measures. Psychologists and criminologists should be
key collaborators in developing solutions in the cybersecurity
domain.
Conclusions
The goal of this article is to provide an overview of cybersecurity, a
comprehensive review of significant simulation efforts for cyberse-
curity, and propose a way forward for advancing both simulation
and cybersecurity areas. It begins by inferring the dimensions of
cybersecurity—threats, targets, and preventative measures—to pro-
vide a foundational understanding of the cybersecurity landscape.
Targets refer to systems or networks of interests whose breach can
provide benefit to nonlegitimate users. Threats or attacks refer to
the negative outcomes of nonlegitimate access to cyber systems,
data, or people due to different types of attack conducted by differ-
ent vectors (attacker or attacking tool). Preventive measures refer to
all efforts that attempt to reduce the probability of attacks ever
occurring through technology, education, and policy.
The article reviews some of the important areas that simulation
is used in cybersecurity—representative environment building; test,
evaluation, and exploration; training and exercises; risk analysis and
assessment; and exploring the humans in cybersecurity.
Representative environment building refers to the creation of net-
works and connected systems consisting of physical or virtual
machines with simulation providing a flexible alternative. Test,
evaluation, and exploration in cybersecurity involve recognizing
when an attack is occurring, understanding the effects of different
attacks, and learning which responses are most effective against the
attack. Training and exercises, like in other areas where simulation
is used, provides a platform (less expensive and more flexible) for
acquiring specific skills. Risk analysis and assessment refer to the
use of simulations as the means to assess risk metrics to potentially
develop policies, approaches, or technology to minimize such risk.
Lastly, modeling humans in the context of cyber is a major line of re-
search that puts people as part of cyber defense and attack.
Attackers, CSA, and general system users interact to shape cyber-
space as it exists today, especially when considering organizational
context like costs associated with cyber disruption and loss of organ-
izational image.
Last, we discussed a proposed way forward by developing means
to establish data collection and access to inform models, to use exist-
ing social theories to create new theoretical constructs specific to the
cybersecurity domain, and considering behavioral models in cyber
as the means to develop sociotechnical solutions. The challenges of
cybersecurity are vast and growing. Securing cyberspace is an impos-
ing task that will take great technical ability combined with
behavioral insights. We argued that simulations should play a bigger
role, while more focused research is needed in this area.
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